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  Chapter 2 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 
 
 
 
 
While Parliament remains the principal legislator, other administrative bodies, 
agencies and authorities may likewise be conferred with law-making powers by 
Parliament.  The growth of delegated or subsidiary legislation in the form of rules, by-
laws, regulations, orders or other instrument is reflective of government’s increased role 
in administration.  Under the Malaysian legal system, the delegation of powers to 
members of the executive such as the minister is common.  He is generally conferred 
with discretionary powers to make decisions pertaining to the particular issues at hand.  
It is also common to find within Acts of Parliament, what is known as ouster or privatise 
clauses, wherein it will be enacted that a minister’s or other executive’s decision on any 
matter shall be regarded as final and may not be questioned in court. The delegation of 
broad discretionary powers, coupled with the ouster of the jurisdiction of courts have 
contributed to the healthy growth of administrative law in Malaysia, and an active and 
at times interventionist judiciary has seen to it that there is a richness of case law and 
case precedent which sets out the rules and principles regarding this subject. 
1.  PROCEDURE 
It has been long acknowledged that judicial review is not an appeal – in the 
process of exercising judicial review over the inferior tribunals, the superior courts 
exercise merely a supervisory jurisdiction as opposed to an appellate jurisdiction.117 
Application for judicial review requires leave of court.  Order 53 rule 1(1) of the 
                                                 
117 Hotel Equatorial (M) Sdn Bhd v Nat. Union of Hotel, Bar & Restaurant Workers [1984] 1 MLJ 363; 
Chief Constable of the North Wales Police v Evans [1982] 1 WLR 1155. 
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 Rules of the High Court provides that no application for an order of mandamus, 
prohibition or certiorari shall be made unless leave has been granted in accordance with 
this rule.  The procedure for leave is set out under Order 53 rule 1(2), which provides 
for the application for leave to be made ex parte and supported by a statement setting 
out the name and description of the applicant, the relief sought and the grounds on 
which it is sought, and by affidavits to be filed before the application is made, verifying 
the facts relied on.  This requirement has been judicially interpreted as imposing upon 
the party a duty to disclose material facts, the breach of which could result in the order 
being set aside.118 
Judicial review in Malaysia follows closely the law in the United Kingdom, that 
is, through the issue of the prerogative writs of certiorari, mandamus and prohibition 
developed by the Court of King’s Bench.  Declaration and Injunction, developed by the 
Court of Chancery, are also added to the list of prerogative writs. 
2.  LEGAL BASES FOR REVIEW BY HIGH COURT 
There are several legal bases upon which the High Court will review the 
decision of an inferior tribunal or an administrative body or a member of the executive.  
They can be summarized as follows: 
(i) Illegality, that is, where a wrong decision has been made, whether due to 
taking into account irrelevant matters or not taking into account matters 
which are relevant; 
(ii) rationality, which refers to unreasonable decisions, the yardstick of the 
doctrine of unreasonableness being the English case of Associated 
Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v Wednesbury Corporation,119 and 
(iii) Procedural impropriety, which refers to the need to follow the rules of 
procedural fairness or natural justice. 
 
Where statute contains an ouster clause, the basis for review had been that 
judicial review would not lie except for errors of law, which affects the jurisdiction of 
the tribunal or administration (what is commonly known at common law as 
                                                 
118 Tuan Haji Sarip Hamid v Patco Malaysia Bhd [1995] 2 MLJ 442. 
119 [1948] 1 KB 223. 
 36
 jurisdictional errors of law).  However, since the decision of the House of Lords in 
Anisminic v Foreign Compensation Commission,120 this legal basis has been altered – 
judicial review will now be effected for mere errors of law (or errors of law on the face 
of the record) as opposed to jurisdictional errors of law.121   In Malaysia, there was 
initial confusion as Malaysian courts felt bound by a Privy Council decision on appeal 
from Malaysia, that is, the case of South East Asia Firebricks Sdn Bhd v Non-Metallic 
Mineral Products Manufacturing Employees Union, 122  which decided that judicial 
review will only lie for jurisdictional errors of law, and not errors of law on the face of 
the record.  However, in 1995, the Malaysian Court of Appeal delivered judgment in the 
case of Syarikat Kenderaan Melayu Kelantan Bhd v Transport Workers’ Union,123 which 
affirmed that judicial review will lie for all errors of law and is not restricted to 
jurisdictional errors of law.  Since this decision, the Malaysian judiciary has adopted a 
pro-active and interventionist approach in judicial review, culminating in the case of R. 
Rama Chandran v The Industrial Court,124 which decided that in the exercise of judicial 
review, the tribunal’s decision may be reviewed “for substance as well as process”, and 
that should the decision be found to be wrong, the court had the power to mould the 
appropriate relief and award it to the party concerned instead of remitting the case back 
to the tribunal for a re-hearing.  This decision has gone much further than the House of 
Lords’ decisions, and has greatly expanded the scope of the doctrine of judicial review 
in Malaysia, so much so in effect, there is really no difference anymore between a 
review and an appeal. 
3.  THE DOCTRINE OF PROPORTIONALITY 
The Malaysian courts have begun to apply the doctrine of proportionality 
borrowed from the continental droit administratif with the case of Tan Teck Seng v 
Suruhanjaya Perkhidmatan Pendidikan.125  In that case, it was decided that by virtue of 
                                                 
120 [1969] 2 AC 147. 
121 Upheld, since then, by other Court of Appeal and House of Lords’ decisions, for example Re A 
Company [1980] 1 All ER 284 (CA); Re Racal Communications [1981] AC 374 (HL); Page v Hull 
University Visitor [1993] 1 All ER 97 (HL). 
122 [1980] 2 MLJ 165. 
123 [1995] 2 MLJ 317. 
124 [1997] 1 MLJ 145. 
125 [1996] 1 MLJ 261. 
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 the constitutional guarantee of certain fundamental liberties, “fair and just punishment” 
must be imposed, that is, the sentence had to suit the offence and the offender without 
being disproportionate as to shock the conscience. 
4.  CONCLUSION 
Post – Rama Chandran and Tan Teck Seng, the Malaysian courts appear to 
retreat from their pro-active and interventionist stance.  Subsequent decisions on judicial 
review had not picked up from where the earlier cases had left off.  For example, in the 
case of Ng Hock Cheng v Pengarah,126 the Federal Court appeared to disapprove of the 
proportionality principle.  Similarly, there are decisions, which have not applied the 
greatly expanded scope of judicial review formulated in the case of R Rama Chandran.  
For example, in Michael Lee v Menteri Sumber Manusia,127 the court observed that the 
exercise of discretionary power was vested in the Minister, not the courts, and that when 
this discretion is challenged, the court must be vigilant and resist any temptation to 
convert the jurisdiction of the court to review into a consideration of the case on its 
merits as if on appeal.  The result is that there is some uncertainty at the moment 
regarding the scope of the doctrine of judicial review. 
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